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Articles
Patricia Hughes* Recognizing Substantive Equality
as a Foundational Constitutional
Principle
The author proposes that substantive equality be recognized as a foundational
constitutional principle. The foundational principles--or underlying constitutional
norms-which constitute the constitutional framework have become more impor-
tant as Canada matures as a regime governed by constitutional supremacy. Most
prime social and political values have been recognized as underlying constitu-
tional norms, including democracy, federalism, protection of minority rights,
political speech and judicial independence. Although section 15 of the Charter
has been interpreted as encompassing substantive equality, which has been
identified as a significant social value by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court
has yet to include it among the foundational constitutional principles. The author
explains why it should be included, discusses why the explicit guarantee under
section 15 is inadequate for this purpose, addresses alternative approaches to a
separate identification of substantive equality and outlines some of the elements
which should be included in a foundational constitutional principle of substantive
equality.
L'auteur pr6conise que 'on reconnaisse I'6galit6 mat6rielle comme principe
constitutionnel fondamental. Les principes g6n6raux-ou normes
constitutionnelles sous-jacentes-autourdesquelles s'articule la charpente de la
constitution ont gagn6 de I'importance avec la maturation du r6gime canadien,
lequel est r~gi par la primaute de la constitution. La plupart de nos valeurs
sociales et politiques primordiales ont 6t6 reconnues comme normes
constitutionnelles sous-jacentes, notamment la democratie, le f6ddralisme, la
protection des droits des minorit6s, la libert6 d'expression et l'independance du
judiciaire. Cependant, m~me s'l estconvenu que I'article 15 de la Charte englobe
I'6galitd mat6rielle et que la Cour Supr6me du Canada la reconnat comme une
valeursociale significative, la Courn'en a pas encore fait un principe constitutionnel
fondamental. L'auteur explique pourquoi il faudrait inclure 1'6galit6 mat6rielle,
pourquoilesgaranties explicites offertesauxtermes del'article 15sontinad6quates
6 cette fin, propose d'autres approches a I'identification de I'egalit6 materielle et
d6finitcertains 6l6ments qui pourraient tre inclus dans le principe constitutionnel
fondamental d'dgalit6 mat6rielle.
* Mary Louise Lynch Chair in Women and Law, Faculty of Law, University of New
Brunswick. I want to thank the participants in the Feminism and Law Workshop at the
University of Toronto on 30 October 1998 for their helpful comments on an earlier and rather
different version of this paper and Mayo Moran, Jennifer Nedelsky and Alan Hutchinson
whose comments particularly assisted in my determining the final direction of the argument.
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Introduction
Substantive equality1 should be accorded the same foundational consti-
tutional status as political speech, democracy or judicial independence.
All of these are values we consider crucial to Canada's political and legal
identity; yet of these only substantive equality cannot make claim to be
a part of the foundation of our constitutional "edifice." Political expres-
sion, democracy and judicial independence, as well as other values of
similar weight, have all been recognized as fundamental or foundational
constitutional principles by the Supreme Court of Canada. In a country
governed by constitutional supremacy, the foundational elements of the
constitution work together to establish the framework with which gov-
ernment action must conform. Therefore, it is crucial that those values
which have a primary role to play in characterizing the country's political
culture be part of this mix of values. They constitute a potentially
powerful judicial tool for enhancing constitutionalized protections. In the
last decade in particular, the list of constitutional principles has grown.
Substantive equality has yet to find its place among them. In the next
several pages, I explain why it should be.
I first consider how the Supreme Court of Canada has articulated both
the constitutional principles comprising Canada's constitutional frame-
work and their role in Canada's constitutional regime. I then explain why
substantive equality should be included among these underlying consti-
tutional norms, initially exploring the roots of equality in liberal theory
and practice in order to lay the groundwork for a discussion of the
importance of substantive equality in the ordering of contemporary
Canadian society. In this section I also address some of the arguments
which might be raised against recognition of a substantive equality
constitutional principle, thereby explaining why a separate substantive
equality principle is both necessary and justified. Finally, I outline some
of the elements of a constitutional principle of substantive equality,
I. By substantive equality, I mean most simply a form of equality which is satisfied only if
policy or law is made meaningful for all members of society, including those who have been
racialized or systemically defined by gender, sexuality or disability or similar kinds of
characteristics, as well as intersecting identities; in contrast, formal equality is satisfied if
everyone is treated as subject to the law or is subject to it in the same way. For brief definitions
of equality, see, for example, Joel Bakan, Just Words: ConstitutionalRights and Social Wrongs
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 46.
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building on the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 15 of the
Charter without being limited by it. Throughout the analysis, I show that
the recognition of a constitutional principle of substantive equality would
be consistent with the Supreme Court's development of constitutional
principles which they have already articulated.
I. Foundational Constitutional Principles
1. The Contemporary Significance of Foundational Principles
Many political and social values which have a major impact in the
ordering of Canadian society have received recognition as "underlying
constitutional principles." Also called "foundational," "fundamental" or
"organizing" constitutional principles, these are political, social and legal
values or principles upon which the ordering of Canadian society rests.2
They have been identified by the Supreme Court of Canada as establish-
ing the parameters of our constitutional framework.3 They include,
among others, principles relating to our political structure such as
federalism and democracy; unwritten norms representing a commitment
to treating citizens appropriately (the rule of law and respect for minority
interests) and ensuring the means of their involvement in the political
system (free speech); and unwritten rules reflecting the integrity of the
legal system (judicial independence). Underlying constitutional prin-
ciples reflect a country's national values, historical development and
2. The Supreme Court of Canada has used all these terms to describe core constitutional
principles: Quebec Secession Reference, [ 1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. In that case, they used the phrase
"internal architecture" of the Constitution to refer to the sum of the principles: ibid., at 248. Yet
another term used to describe these principles is "unwritten norm": Provincial Judges
Reference, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 93.
3. The Court has developed the idea of fundamental constitutional principles most fully
(although not only) in the Quebec Secession Reference, ibid., and the Provincial Judges
Reference, ibid. They have acquired more importance since the advent of constitutionalism in
1982, but they existed prior to the shift from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional
supremacy: see, for example, Chevrier v. Canada (1880), 4 S.C.R. 1, in which Henry J. (in
dissent) referred, at 129, to "constitutional doctrines, underlying rights and liberties necessary
for the government of the empire and the administration of justice"; Ontario (Attorney-
General) v. Canada (Attorney-General) (1908), 39 S.C.R. 14, a case dealing with the rights of
the province vis-a-vis the federal government with respect to trust funds, in which Idington J.
(in dissent) referred, at 42, to "a form that the representatives of the people are asked to sanction
every important step of ministers in the conduct of the business of the Crown" having the status
of "constituted law that bind ministers and Crown alike and have secured and still secure the
liberties of the people"; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [ 1959] S.C.R. 121, a decision relying on the
application of the fundamental principle of the rule of law. Post- 1982, also see the Manitoba
Language Rights Reference, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, in which the Court referred, at 752, to
"unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada" and New
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1
S.C.R. 319, in which McLachlin J. (for the majority) recognized, at 377, "principles
constitutionalized by virtue of this preamble."
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political framework. Foundational principles will affect both institu-
tional arrangements and relations between the state and individuals and
among various groups of inhabitants.
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada
identified four underlying "foundational" constitutional principles which
"inform'and sustain the [Canadian] constitutional text: they are the vital
unstated assumptions upon which the text is based."4 These principles,
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law and respect
for minority rights, are not the only foundational principles characteriz-
ing Canadian constitutionalism, only the most significant with respect to
the potential dissolution of the country, the subject matter of that case. For
example, in the Provincial Judges Reference Lamer C.J., for the majority,
named, among other "organizing principles of the Constitution Act
1867," the independence of judges because in that case the issue was the
independence of provincial court judges.5 More important than the
identification of specific principles, however, these cases, particularly
the Quebec Secession Reference, contain the most extensive consider-
ation of foundational constitutional principles to be found in thejurispru-
dence.
The acknowledgment of a broader range of fundamental constitutional
principles has accompanied the growth of constitutionalism since 1982
and, indeed, may be seen as a concomitant of the shift to a regime of
constitutional supremacy. In 1981, for example, the Court had occasion
to address this question in the context of the Patriation Reference which,
along with its discussion of constitutional conventions, also contained a
statement explaining that the reason for the convention of provincial
agreement to constitutional amendments affecting the provinces is the
"federal principle. ' '6 The Court referred to the Reference re Alberta
Statutes which relied on "judicially developed legal principles and
doctrines," none of which was found in the express provisions of the
British North America Acts or other constitutional enactments,7 and then
4. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 247.
5. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 2. The Chief Justice also identified as organizing
principles or "fundamental constitutional rules" the doctrines of "full faith and credit,"
paramountcy and "the remedial innovation of suspended declarations of invalidity": ibid. at 75.
6. Patriation Reference, [ 1981 ] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 905. Constitutional values are the "pivot" of
the conventions; another example is the democratic principle and the convention of responsible
government: ibid. at 880.
7. Reference re Alberta Statutes, [ 1938] S.C.R. 100. The Court relied on the principles relating
to political expression in this case.
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went on to describe these principles in a cautious, almost defensive,
fashion:
[A]II [the principles developed] have been perceived to represent consti-
tutional requirements that are derived from the federal character of
Canada's Constitution... [T]hey have been accorded full legal force in the
sense of being employed to strike down legislative enactments... [Ejach
was judicially developed in response to a particular legislative initiative in
respect of which it might been observed . . . 'There are no Canadian
constitutional law precedents addressed directly to the present issue.. '8
Even more recently there was, it seems, a greater reluctance to apply
the constitutional principles than was evident in the Provincial Judges
Reference and in the Quebec Secession Reference. In New Brunswick
Broadcasting Co., for example, there is some question about the appro-
priateness of employing the constitutional principle of the inherent
privileges of Canada's legislative bodies to address whether the media
could be prevented from filming the Nova Scotia House of Assembly's
proceedings; the judges who followed this approach felt compelled to
explain that
[These privileges] ... fall within the group of principles constitutionalized
by virtue of [the] preamble. . . .This is not a case of importing an
unexpressed concept into our constitutional regime, but of recognizing a
legal power fundamental to the constitutional regime which Canada has
adopted in its Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982.9
Some of the motivation for McLachlin J.'s apparent "need" to clarify
the nature of the principle at issue likely arose from Chief Justice Lamer's
reluctance "to import unexpressed concepts... in a way that would evade
scrutiny under the express guarantees of the Charter." 10 Although relying
on a constitutional principle for the majority decision, McLachlin J. said
that she shared the Chief Justice's concern that "unwritten concepts not
be freely imported into a constitutional regime which has culminated in
a written constitution."' I She made a distinction between "unexpressed
concepts" and inferred concepts from (in this case) the preamble.
8. Patriation Reference, supra note 6 at 844-45 (per dissent).
9. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co., supra note 3 at 377. The majority view meant that as a
constitutional principle, the exercise of the inherent legislative privileges were immune from
constitutional review.
10. Ibid. at 355. It is interesting to compare the Chief Justice's approach in this case with the
more expansive view he takes of the principles in the Provincial Judges Reference (in which
La Forest J., having concurred with McLachlin J.' s reasoning in New Brunswick Broadcasting,
argued that it was inappropriate to extend the constitutional principle of judicial independence
as the Chief Justice had done): supra note 3.
t1. Ibid. at 376.
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In the Provincial Judges Reference and especially in the Quebec
Secession Reference, by contrast, the identification of constitutional
principles relies neither on the preamble nor on the federal structure
necessarily (although a number do), but on broader considerations about
the constitutional "edifice." Furthermore, the assertion of the importance
of these principles lacks the caution and restraint evident in the earlier
cases, a change which is perhaps consistent with the recognition that a
system of constitutional supremacy provides more scope in this regard
than does a system of parliamentary supremacy. This broadening of the
identification, scope and application of the constitutional principles is
one in which a substantive equality constitutional principle fits comfort-
ably in the same way that the protection of minority (and perhaps
separately of aboriginal) rights does. It acknowledges a value which was
extant in earlier Canadian legal and political practices, but which has
gained a contemporary significance beyond that originally ascribed to it.
It is not surprising that the most extensive discussion and enumeration
of the principles are to be found in recent cases. Although fundamental
constitutional principles have always been part of Canada's constitu-
tional framework, they have gained new significance through the shift
from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy which oc-
curred in 1982. This shift has resulted in increased jurisdiction (or power)
in the Court which includes the enhanced development of these common
law constitutional principles. Constitutionalism envisions a different
place for courts from that granted them by parliamentary supremacy; it
recognizes them as partners in the organizing of the society.12 Through
the constitutional principles, the judiciary embeds the nation's most
significant values in the fabric of the society and ensures that they are not
subject to the vagaries of political administrations.13
12. Indeed as protectors of the constitution it may give them a superior status to the
legislatures. See W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and
Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994) for a negative appraisal of
the enhanced powers of the judiciary.
13. In saying this I acknowledge that section 15 of the Charter is subject to the Charter's
override provision in section 33 (although because of section 28 this is questionable with
respect to sex equality) and therefore equality seems to be a value that the legislatures have said
can be subject to political vagaries (although there is an argument in my view that section 28
of the Charter exempts sex equality from the override). The same can be said of political speech,
the expression of which has already received recognition as a foundational constitutional
principle, but which is guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Charter and is subject to the
override. My point, however, is that equality as a foundational principle is not the same as the
explicit constitutional provision in section 15 but is at the same time deeper and broader than
is section 15's guarantee and no doubt the same would be said of political expression as a
foundational principle.
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2. The Significance of Constitutional Principles
a. Their Purpose
Regardless of their content, fundamental constitutional principles cap-
ture the major features and values of the legal and political system. They
establish the parameters within which the structures, institutions and
practices are organized and within which they operate. They encompass
and help to integrate new political and constitutional arrangements, such
as the Nisga'a Agreement entered into in August 1998 by the British
Columbia government, the Federal Government and the Nisga'a Nation
to settle land claims by the Nisga'a. Providing for a Nisga'a government
to govern Nisga'a lands, the Agreement changes the nature of decision-
making in Canada by inserting a new level of government in the territory
covered by the Agreement which must interact with the current federal-
ism, that is, with the powers currently exercised by the provincial and
federal governments.14 Challenges to and the operation of these new
arrangements may well be-indeed, should be-informed by the funda-
mental constitutional principles of federalism with its divided or shared
political decision-making, democracy with its aspect of self-government
and either respect for minority rights or, more likely, an independent
respect for aboriginal rights.'5 In short, it would not be surprising if
political decisions about a new status for the Nisga'a Nation would have
to meet the requirements inherent in Canada's constitutional framework
which comprises in part the distinct but interrelated fundamental or
foundational principles which I have identified, in the same way that
attempts at dissolution of Canada will have to meet them.
14. The Nisga'a Agreement can be found on the British Columbia Ministry of Aboriginal
Affairs website: <http://www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/aaf/>. It has been approved in a referendum held
among the Nisga'a in November 1998 and approved by the British Columbia Legislature in
April 1999. Debate has begun in the House of Commons. It was made the subject of a court
challenge by the Liberal Party of British Columbia: Paul Willcocks, "Lawsuit premature: B.C.
government" The Globe and Mail (23 November 1998). The Liberals wanted a province-wide
referendum on the Agreement which they claim amends the Constitution Act, 1867, since the
British Columbia Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 67 requires a
referendum on a constitutional amendment.
15. The Supreme Court of Canada identified federalism, democracy and respect for minority
rights as foundational or fundamental constitutional principles in the Quebec Secession
Reference, supra note 2. The Court indicated that protection of aboriginal interests might be
an element of the broader respect for minority rights or it might constitute its own principle.
I would argue that the preferable approach is to recognize it as an independent principle to
acknowledge that First Nations are not in the same position as other so-called "minorities."
Federalism, while capturing a highly salient aspect of aboriginal interests, self-government,
does not capture all of them. As with other interests, however, these approaches are not
mutually exclusive and the articulation of a freestanding principle does not mean that the values
it represents are not reflected in other principles.
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These principles fill in the gaps of the written text; they are not merely
abstract or philosophical guidelines, but may give rise to "substantive
legal obligations" of either a general or precise nature. The Supreme
Court of Canada described them as being "invested with a powerful
normative force."'16 Governments and courts are expected to observe
them. Unlike conventions, sanction for their breach lies in a court of law
and not "merely" with the political process.
Status as a fundamental constitutional principle, therefore, means that
the concept involved will help to define the constitutional framework,
influence the interpretation of express provisions and fill in the gaps of the
constitutional text. It will apply to any exercise of political authority and
to the courts. Consequently, as a whole, these principles have the
potential to play a role more extensive than can any particular express
constitutional provision, no matter how important.
b. Their Evolution
The identification of foundational constitutional principles is not limited
to those which were implicit in the preamble to the Constitution Act,
1867, although this was for some time the major and perhaps sole source
of the principles, but may include principles which have never been
articulated before, as long as they are rooted in Canadian practices and
values. 7 Nor do the principles remain static. It is beyond dispute that at
some level law must keep in step with social and political changes. It is
incumbent on government to amend, repeal or enact legislation with this
principle in mind. It is similarly within "the inherent jurisdiction of the
courts to modify or extend the common law in order to comply with
prevailing social conditions and values." 8 This principle applies not only
to ordinary legislative and common law developments, but to basic
constitutional principles. It is the nature of constitutional principles that
they are not defined by the fashion of the times and that they are not easily
changeable, but it has also been stated clearly that the interpretation given
to the terms of a written constitution must evolve in a manner consistent
16. lbid. at 249.
17. In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court's according of "foundational
principle" status to respect for minority interests is indicative of the "addition" of principles
based on contemporary relevance: supra note 2 at 261-62.
18. Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at 1169 (Cory J.).
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with the developments in the country as a whole. 19 The same is true of the
common law constitution or the manner in which fundamental constitu-
tional principles, such as judicial independence, are defined. With respect
to judicial independence, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada has
said that although the origins of judicial independence concerned only
superior court judges, "our Constitution has evolved over time. In the
same way that our understanding of rights and freedoms has grown, such
that they have now been expressly entrenched through the enactment of
the Constitution Act, 1982, so too has judicial independence grown into
a principle that now extends to all courts, not just the superior courts of
this country."20 The fundamental principles must reflect the legal culture,
while at the same time they will also inform it. In the United States, for
instance, the principles of separation of powers and federalism have both
changed since 1787 when the United States Federal Constitution came
into effect, with almost a reversal of the form federalism originally
assumed.2'
Evolution occurs not only with respect to the meaning of particular
principles, but also with respect to the "list" of identified principles. Thus
while a number of these principles have had long-standing recognition,
albeit having evolved in meaning since confederation, 22 others have only
recently emerged, most notably respect for minority interests which was
first explicitly identified in the Quebec Secession Reference.23
19. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 123. Compare the approach taken by a number of
justices of the United States Supreme Court where there is a more fervent struggle between the
originalists (what did the Constitution mean when it was enacted?) and those justices who
believe in a modern Constitution. See, for example, Antonin Scalia, et al., A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997). Some commentators have suggested, however, that originalism is a straw doctrine: See
also Eric J. Segall, "A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate" (1998) 15
Constitutional Commentary 411.
20. Reference re Provincial Judges, supra note 2, at 76. Mr. Justice La Forest strongly
maintained that the Chief Justice's extrapolation of provincial judges' judicial independence
from this principle was inappropriate, at the very least because counsel had merely referred to
it briefly and because the issue is relevant to the relations between the political and judicial
branches: at 175.
21. Michel Rosenfeld, "Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diver-
sity," in Michel Rosenfeld, ed., Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) at 12. Rosenfeld also briefly discusses "dramatic"
changes to French constitutional principles.
22. In the case of democracy, for example, not only has the extension of the franchise meant
that many more people are entitled to participate in the vote than was the case in 1867, but the
conceptual understanding of democracy has changed, as discussed by the Supreme Court in the
Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 255.
23. Ibid. at 261-63.
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c. Their Relationship to the Explicit Provisions
The principles must be read in conjunction with the explicit constitutional
provisions found in the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982. Some of the
principles may have been developed because there was not reference to
the value underlying the principle in the written constitution. The politi-
cal expression principles, for example, were developed or identified at a
time when there was no explicit free speech guarantee in the Constitution
and no doubt were identified precisely for that reason. Nevertheless, they
evidently continue despite the subsequent inclusion of the guarantee of
freedom of expression in the Charter, having been listed among the
current principles in the Provincial Judges Reference.24 Many of the
principles were inferred from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867
or from the federal structure of Canada. Most of the broad fundamental
principles are linked to corresponding explicit provisions in the constitu-
tion, such as a description of which level of government exercises which
powers (the federalism principle), a guarantee of voting rights and a
limitation on the length of the legislative assembly (both reflecting the
democracy principle), a guarantee of free expression (the "implied bill of
rights" political expression principle), the guarantee of minority lan-
guage education rights (the minority rights principle) and provision for
the appointment, payment and tenure of superior court judges (the
principle of judicial independence). Fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples may be considered the source of the explicit provisions which
"merely elaborate those organizing principles in the institutional appara-
tus they create or contemplate. ' 25 On the one hand, therefore, they are not
displaced by explicit provisions. On the other hand, their contemporary
meaning may be affected by the explicit provisions, as is the case with
judicial independence, considered below. Moreover, the impact of these
principles is not limited to whatever corresponding specific provisions
may exist, but are employed to develop a coherent interpretation of the
constitution as a whole: they operate "in symbiosis. '2 6
24. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 2 at 74-75.
25. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 2 at 69.
26. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 248. Regardless of what may be a complex
interrelationship between principles and explicit rights, the Supreme Court has stated that
"there are compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of our written Constitution": ibid. at
249.
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d. The Importance of Identification as a Principle
The choice of values, concepts or organizational frameworks which
enjoy the status of fundamental, foundational or organizing principles
signifies the kind of concerns which occupy the society. The identifica-
tion of the principles reflects their judicially determined nature. Thus a
doctrine which did not in fact receive wide support among the judiciary
of one judicial era might nevertheless become a constitutional principle
or "rule" in another. The Chief Justice's discussion of political speech in
the Provincial Judges Reference illustrates this point.27 He draws from
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867's recognition of Parliamentary
democracy a guarantee of freedom of public or political expression.
Given the importance of political expression to national political life-
to democracy-and also the intention to create one country, he explains
that some members of the Court have said that only Parliament can limit
political expression. But, he continues, "[t]he logic of this argument...
compels a much more dramatic conclusion... [,J that Parliament itself
is incompetent to 'abrogate this right of discussion and debate."' Thus
"the preamble's recognition of the democratic nature of Parliamentary
governance has been used by some members of the Court to fashion an
implied bill of rights, in the absence of any express indication to this effect
in the constitutional text" [i.e., the Constitution Act, 1867]. He subse-
quently lists these two "guarantees" of political speech as organizing
principles of the Constitution Act, 1867, identified by the preamble which
"invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a consti-
tutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express
terms of the constitutional text. '2 8 What is particularly interesting about
this analysis is that while the limitation to Parliament of the competence
to limit speech (through the criminal law power) may be said to constitute
a majority position, and in any event, uses traditional division of powers
analysis to accomplish its goal, at no time has the implied bill of rights
doctrine attracted a majority of the Court. Yet Lamer C.J., with the
concurrence of the majority of the Court, has identified it as a fundamen-
tal constitutional principle.29
27. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 2 at 74-76.
28. Ibid. at 75.
29. Freedom of speech and expression has also been identified as "a fundamental animating
value in the Canadian constitutional system" and as a "deep-rooted value" and "principle of our
common law constitution": OPSEUv. Ontario (Attorney General), [ 1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 25 and
Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at 462. La Forest J. (for
the Court) has also referred to the "principle of open courts" related to the value of
representative democracy and to the democratic function of public criticism, that is, to the
constitutional principle of free speech, as a common law principle, although one "inextricably
tied to rights guaranteed by s.2(b)": Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General) (1997), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 202-204.
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With respect to the fundamental constitutional principles, therefore, it
is possible to say that they are common law principles, derived from but
not limited to the text, which reflect values significant in the ordering of
Canadian society. There is room for the articulation of "new" principles
for which some form of prior recognition as a constitutional value can be
established or for a revision of previously articulated principles. The
values advanced by the principles overlap with each other and the
principles themselves inform and both extend and limit each other. In the
next section I consider why it is consistent with these characteristics of the
foundational principles to grant that recognition to substantive equality.
II. Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle
There are good reasons why substantive equality should be recognized as
a fundamental constitutional principle: it is a major value in the ordering
of Canadian society and equality in some form has had a constitutional
presence since Confederation; on the other hand, there is no reason that
it should not be so recognized: being a latecomer as a foundational
principle should not be a bar any more than it was a bar for protection of
minority rights. In this section, I establish that substantive equality is a
fundamental value in Canada, consistent with the other principles already
identified. It is an important element in our social ordering. I then indicate
why other possible approaches to incorporating this value in the consti-
tutional framework are not satisfactory. Finally, I explore the form a
foundational constitutional principle of substantive equality might
assume.
1. The Evolution of Equality Practice
The first inroad of liberalism into absolutism and inequality occurred
with the basic liberal commitment to a set of fundamental political rights
which would accrue to all citizens.30 Equality represented an equal claim
to political rights which were designed to promote the liberty of all
30. For example, Eric Hobsbawm listed the interrelated liberal values of the nineteenth
century as "distrust of dictatorship and absolute rule; a commitment to constitutional govern-
ment with or under freely elected governments and representative assemblies, which guaran-
teed the rule of law; and an accepted set of citizens' rights and liberties, including freedom of
speech, publication and assembly. State and society should be informed by the values of reason,
public debate, education, science and the improvability (though not necessarily the perfectibil-
ity) of the human condition:" Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991
(London: Abacus, 1995), 109-110. These in many respects remain predominant liberal values,
although in some respects transformed through the century. Also see George Sabine, A History
of Political Theory, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Ill: Dryden Press, 1973) at 668.
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individuals in the society.3 This view of equality as an exercise of
political rights was transformed into one which took account of social
expectations and thus one which distinguished between "natural" distinc-
tions and social distinctions, those arising from economic status, and the
interrelated distinctions resulting from inequality on the basis of, for
example, race or sex (the "conventional inequality" to which I referred
earlier). In part, this transformation or extension was necessitated by
liberalism's individualist commitment to capitalism which meant in
practice that political equality was compromised by distinctions of
wealth even after the erosion of the earlier legal inequality characteristic
of previous hierarchical political and economic systems. The recognition
that "certain basic capacities and needs are possessed equally by all"32 led
(eventually) to a concomitant principle to respond to the inability of
everyone to enjoy those needs because of natural inequalities. Some
reconciliation between liberalism's equality of opportunity (underlying
its economic strand) and the reality of both conventional and natural
inequalities was needed. If people were to enjoy commonly recognized
needs and were to realize an equal opportunity for self-development
which was at the heart of the evolving liberalism, some account must be
taken of different needs. At first this principle acknowledged obvious
differences. As Raphael points out, everyone needs food, but a diabetic
needs insulin; every child needs education, but visually impaired children
require "special, more costly facilities." Equal distribution of the means
to enjoy basic needs or the equal opportunity for self-development
means, therefore, an "equitable, not an arithmetically equal, distribu-
tion."33 The most commonly held liberal view was that where possible,
31. E.F. Carritt explains that while liberty and democracy (that is, political equality) were first
seen as antithetical, in Great Britain it came to be believed "finally by almost all public
speakers" of whatever political persuasion that democracy or political equality safeguarded
liberty: "Liberty and Equality" in Anthony Quinton, ed. Political Philosophy (London: Oxford
University Press, 1973) at 127. In fact, the notion that equality of all interferes with liberty for
some remains one of the tensions of liberalism today.
32. D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, rev. ed. (London: MacMillan Press,
1976) at 185.
33. Ibid. at 192. Raphael makes the important distinction, which is fundamental to how the
liberal equal opportunity and the taking into account of difference interrelate, between benefits
(or results) and means: "So there is a sense in which the distribution of benefits, of satisfaction
received, is equal, although the distribution of means to benefit is unequal because of special
needs" [emphasis in original]. In this sense, providing different means in accordance with need
is a way of removing barriers, even though the way of removing barriers is actually constituted
by a positive giving (of insulin or of special educational facilities, for example).
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these natural disadvantages ought to be minimized; only the most ardent
believer in individualism believed that they were simply a factor in a
societal version of Darwinism.34
Legal equality, social equality, economic equality, moral equality and
political equality: while they overlap and influence each other, as a
practical matter, movement towards them does not always keep pace.
What does it mean to speak of being "politically equal," for example? All
citizens have one vote; yet not everyone has the same access to resources
to influence the political system. Each person is equal under the law; yet
not everyone has the same resources with respect to access to the law.
While there is a belief that the law should be available to everyone and
there are programs in place to assist in providing access, the result is far
from equal access. It is obvious-so much so that it is trite to say-that
economic inequality can influence the realization of political and legal
equality. These apparent "contradictions" are consistent with the liberal
understanding of equality which attempts to accommodate both a social
or moral equality with an economic individualism.
Nevertheless, one of the great on-going claims (and to a lesser degree
triumphs) of the liberal ethos is the formative role that the concept of
equality has played in modern societies. Greek society, feudal systems,
the periods of slavery and then segregation in the southern United States,
apartheid South Africa or Canada's reserve system: these were or are
systems organized around exclusion based on difference. Particular
groups of people were legally excluded from thepolis, or status was static
and clearly drawn.35 Certainly this was breaking down prior to the
beginning of the twentieth century; equally certainly it has not been
broken down yet as we enter the twenty-first. In contrast, liberalism has
in the past hundred years or so increasingly promoted the possibility of
social or economic mobility and the inclusion of all members of society
within the legal system. This is the case in Canada notwithstanding the
egregious separate legal regime for status "Indians" under the Indian Act,
even if it is dissipating in the face of greater aboriginal self-government.
Laissez-faire liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism, has been
34. Indeed, Sabine maintained twenty-five years ago that "[f]rom John Stuart Mill on, no
important liberal thinker except Herbert Spencer defended a theory that even approximated
laissezfaire": supra note 30 at 669. On the other hand, the debate Sabine identified as "at what
point would the regulation of business enterprise become a hazard for political liberalism" has
continued, not only in that form, but in the more contemporary form of determining how the
pursuit of equality through the positive recognition of difference interferes with liberty. I
discuss this point further below.
35. For example, in Canada status Indians were disenfranchised federally until 1960; non-
status Indians were enfranchised provincially over a period lasting from 1949 (British
Columbia) until 1969 (Quebec).
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weakened considerably by the development of social liberalism or
welfare-state liberalism. Classical liberalism, reactive to the decline of a
static social order, responsive to the growth of a mercantile class,
confronted by internal migration of poor and unskilled rural labourers to
the urban centres, and dominant in the first significant globalization of the
economy through colonialism, had to contend not only with its opposing
ideology, socialism, but more importantly, the growth within itself of a
new view of social relations. Its conflict with socialism appears to be
resolved in liberalism's favour; its internal conflict is still, to some extent,
being played out, although the taking account of difference which
characterizes contemporary social liberalism has emerged as the stronger
strand.
In short, liberalism contains within itself competing views of what
constitutes the common good and the marks of common citizenship.3 6
Liberal states experience a tension between the commitment to liberty,
the freedom to pursue one' s own good without interference from govern-
ment, and the commitment to equality which may require government
interference to attain. As a result the process of extending equality is not
linear; nor is there universal agreement on the goal or the means. Thus
while the understanding and practice of equality has broadened, there are
also times when the political regimes have retrenched and diminished the
practice of extending equality. It may be said that Canada has been
travelling through such a period in recent years with a heightened sense
of individualism and conservatism. This process of economic retrench-
ment has occurred simultaneously with an increasingly broad judicial
interpretation of the explicit guarantee of equality in the Charter. Despite
this unevenness, liberal societies have increasingly defined themselves as
pluralist societies, defined by a mix of differences based on an ever
increasing list of characteristics. It is the elimination of barriers placed
before persons because of particular characteristics and the correspond-
ing need to acknowledge the legitimacy of differences, to engage in the
"affirmation" of difference, which characterize liberal equality more than
the explicit elimination of economic difference.
36. Here I mean "citizenship" in the sense of participation in society regardless of formal
citizenship, a civic notion rather than a narrower political/legal status based, for example, on
the right to vote.
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2. Substantive Equality in Canadian Society
The importance of equality as a social, legal and political value in
Canadian society has been acknowledged in many ways since Confedera-
tion, in statutes, official policies and practices andjudicial interpretation.
A small number of examples illustrate the point: the reflection of equality
in the religious education and language provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867; in the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights, human rights
legislation, sections 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 7 and other Charter provisions such as minority language
education, mobility rights and freedom of religion; the aboriginal rights
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982; in statutes such as those
requiring pay equity and employment equity; in the sentencing provi-
sions of the Criminal Code; and in practices and policies such as
multiculturalism. Recognition of the gendered nature of the defence of
self-defence and of sexual harassment, the need to address the potential
of racial bias in jurors and the use of sentencing circles are indicative of
the scope of equality's presence in the legal system. While both the
wording and interpretation of these commitments to equality may have
been limited,38 and while advances towards equality have been criticized
37. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.) 1982,
c.1l.
38. The religious education provisions of the Constitution (section 93 of the Constitution Act,
1867 and section 29 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) provide an illustration.
They were implemented to recognize and then affirm minority religious education in effect at
the time of Confederation, but they have found no echo in similar provisions to recognize
publicly funded religious education for more recent religious affiliations and indeed, have been
used to deny extending funding: Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to Amend the Education Act
(Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148; Mahe v. Alberta, [ 1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; and Reference Re Public
Schools Act (Man.), ss. 79(3), 79(4) and 79(7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839 all indicate the wide scope
accorded minority religions who managed to acquire rights in 1867; by contrast, Adler v.
Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 refused similar rights to religions which had not been accorded
rights in 1867. The sex equality provision under the Canadian Bill of Rights proved to be an
enormous disappointment as a consequence of the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation
in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Lavell, [ 19741 S.C.R. 1349 and Bliss v. A.G. Canada, [ 1979]
1 S.C.R. 183 (cf. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282). More recently, the Court's decision in
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 was evidence of how deep-rooted prejudice. against
certain groups (in this case, gays) can undermine section 15 of the Charter (but cf. Vriend v.
Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493).
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or repealed,39 nevertheless they reveal Canada as a country purporting (at
least) to place a high value on reducing the disadvantage consequent on
what has been termed "conventional inequality."I In one way or another,
whether in fact or too often in rhetoric, equality has been held to be a
fundamental societal value in Canada. It is, in other words, to be taken into
account in the ordering of Canadian society through government policy,
in the interpretation of the law, and (because of the impact of policy and
law) in private contexts, as well.
As our understanding of equality has evolved, its role in the ordering
of liberal societies has become more prevalent. It is no longer sufficient
to assess inequality at a surface (overt or obvious) level; rather, more
subtle forms of inequality (disproportionate impact or based on an
intersection of grounds) are now being addressed. While I consider the
complexity of this question below, it is sufficient to say now that the core
element of this contemporary equality-the recognition of difference
instead of homogeneity-which marks what has been called "substantive
equality" pervades official and private thinking with respect to all manner
of policy-making at all levels. In this sense, the concept of substantive
equality is a major value in the organizing of Canadian society. It is a
matter of public deliberation and not merely reflective of a toleration for
39. Bilingualism and multiculturalism have both been criticized, both as too costly, bilingual-
ism as inappropriate where there are equally large or larger communities of ethnic groups other
than francophones and multiculturalism as inconsistent with a "Canadian identity." For
discussion of and responses to some of the criticisms of multiculturalism in particular, see Will
Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998) at 4-5, 16-17, 26. For an indication that multiculturalism (in some
form) is viewed as desirable by Canadians, see Peter S. Li, "The Multicultural Debate," in Peter
S. Li. ed., Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1999) at 162. Li discusses the confusion around this term. An example of the regressive moves
is the repeal of employment equity legislation enacted under the NDP Government in Ontario
repealed by the successor Progressive Conservatives when they came into power in 1995: Job
Quotas Repeal Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c.4; on the unsuccessful challenge to the legislation, see
Ferrel v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to SCC
dismissed: 9 December 1999).
40. This is an inequality traceable to human convention. It refers to the way in which people
are treated because of race, sex or other personal characteristics which is distinguished from
"natural" inequality (whether one can paint well or run fast or whether one has the ability to
be a surgeon or weaver): Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York:
MacMillan, 1992) at 290. Hence we may speak of a "racialized community" to indicate that
the inequality derives not from "race" but from how race is treated. In other words, the
inequality does not derive from the characteristics, but rather from the societal treatment of the
characteristic. "Conventional inequality" is a convenient term, as long as it is remembered (as
Fukuyama does not necessarily do) that one of the benefits of being in the majority or dominant
groups in society is being able to decide what is "conventional" and what is "natural" and that
often the two are conflated.
Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle 23
private expression of differences.4' Consistent with its public articulation
or practice, substantive equality, the form of equality most reflective of
recent advances in equality theory, has been accepted by the Supreme
Court of Canada as an appropriate way to define equality in a constitu-
tional context.42 The Court has recently reinforced its approach by
importing it into human rights legislation .43 To do otherwise than give the
same legal import to direct and adverse effect discrimination, McLachlin
J. said, "may, in practice, serve to legitimize systemic discrimination.""
To say that substantive equality plays a significant part in contempo-
rary Canadian society is not at all the same thing as saying it has always
been realized or that its recognition is unproblematic, either legally or in
practice. On the contrary, one may say about advancing equality, as the
Supreme Court said in a different context,
The concern of our courts and governments to [protect minorities] has
been prominent in recent years, particularly following the enactment of the
Charter. Undoubtedly, one of the key considerations motivating the
enactment of the Charter, and the process of constitutional judicial review
that it entails, is the [protection of minorities]. However, it should not be
forgotten that the [protection of minorities] had a long history before the
enactment of the Charter....
41. Graham Walker, "The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism" in Ian Shapiro & Will
Kymlicka, eds., Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997)
at 154, 170. I consider this point further below.
42. See, for example, the first case decided by the Court under section 15 of the Charter and
the most recent: The Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 166-
68 and Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at517,
518, respectively. In Law, Iacobucci J, for the Court, explains that the equality referred to in
Andrews is substantive equality.
43. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia
Government and Services Employees' Union (B. C. G.S.E. U.), [ 1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. McLachlin J.,
for the Court, characterizes the distinction between direct and adverse effect discrimination as
"artificial" and explains that "[i]nterpreting human rights legislation primarily in terms of
formal equality undermines its promise of substantive equality and prevents consideration of
the effects of systemic discrimination": at 26.
44. Ibid. at 24.
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... Although Canada's record of (the rights of minorities] is not a spotless
one, that goal is one towards which Canadians have been striving since
Confederation, and the process has not been without successes. 5
The process of attaining equality in Canada has been uneven, yet a
commitment to it in some form has never been totally absent. Overall it
can be described more as movement towards increasing equality than the
reverse, both quantitatively and qualitatively: more people are "em-
braced" by the means available to obtain equality (through, for example,
the addition of new grounds to human rights legislation) and the term has
acquired an increasingly sophisticated meaning (as exemplified in the
human rights context as encompassing only overt or direct discrimination
to indirect discrimination to the more subtle systemic discrimination, for
instance; the last in turn has challenged the continued validity of that
earlier progressive move to acknowledge indirect discrimination as a
distinct form of discrimination46 ).
As a theoretical matter, the commitment to equality in Canada, as in
liberal-democratic regimes generally, is grounded in the belief that each
member of society has equal moral worth and as a consequence is entitled
to equal consideration in how society is organized and structured.47 How
this philosophical statement is translated into economic or political
practice or into legal entitlement or status will vary with the demographic
composition, history and political personality of a country. In any given
country this is unlikely to be a simple matter. In Canada this is certainly
true as different stands of "liberalism" co-exist and compete for domi-
nance. There is a constant tension between so-called classical or laissez-
faire liberalism (the liberalism of individualism) and social liberalism
45. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada was speaking about protection of minority rights
in this passage from the Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 262. While it may be true
that in fact protection of minority rights was a major motivating factor in light of the desire of
the Trudeau Government to enact an entrenched bill of rights which would deflate Quebec's
nationalist claims, much attention was paid to the wording of the equality provision to
overcome the limited interpretation of the equality provision of the Bill of Rights. More
importantly, however, recognition that "Canada's record of upholding the rights of minorities
is not a spotless one" did not detract from identifying protection for minority rights as a
constitutional principle in the company of principles such as federalism or the rule of law, both
clearly identifiable as formative constitutional principles and not explicit constitutional
provisions, from the advent of Confederation.
46. British Columbia v. B.C.G.S.E.U., supra note 43 at 24.
47. The moral aspect of equality is a consistent theme in the equality cases under section 15
of the Charter. After reviewing how this idea has been phrased in the various equality decisions,
lacobucci J. sums up this approach in Law as reflecting the intent of section 15 "to promote a
society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of
Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consider-
ation:" Law, supra note 42 at 529.
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which gave rise to human rights legislation (the liberalism of community)
or the welfare-state liberalism which seeks to reconcile economic indi-
vidualism with efforts to moderate the worst ravages of poverty.
The same process has occurred with respect to cultural differences.
Initially, liberal thinkers argued that the state ought to be "neutral" on the
question of difference, treating significant differences as matters of
"private choice and personal taste."48 The state should not be adversarial,
for liberals did not, generally speaking, advocate taking positive action to
force people to discard their differences;4 9 however, cultural differences
were to be left to the private sphere, with the watchword being "tolera-
tion."50 To the extent that this reinforced the hegemony of the dominant
group, it was not really neutrality and over time, it became clear that
neutrality is not consistent with an honest commitment to a pluralist
society. By not intervening, the state can become complicit in perpetuat-
ing disadvantage. While among extreme groups there may be some
question about whether difference should be recognized at all, the
prevalent view, reflected in Canadian government policy and jurispru-
48. Walker, supra note 41.
49. "Their differences" is the key phrase here. At this point, the majority society was treated
as the norm, the appropriate way to be; minorities were the ones who were different, it was they
who would have to change. Today, certainly this is a view held by many people, but with the
increase in people who are "different" from this previous norm there has been an increased
resistance to this approach and one of the underlying elements of substantive equality is that
one group is not necessarily to be characterized as different from some overriding norm, but
that each group is different from the other. Thus women are not different from men, but women
and men are different from each other. Having said this, there are demographic realities, at least,
which mean that there will be some people "in the majority" and others who are far fewer. Over
time, however, the composition of these groups may change, as well as the technology to
remove some of the consequences of being a "minority." For example, today most houses are
more than one story and do not have elevators or other mechanisms for getting upstairs required
by persons using a wheelchair (most do not have ramps to obtain access to the front door, in
fact); there are very few people in wheelchairs compared to people who do not require a
wheelchair. Conceivably all houses would be built (as now are public buildings) to ensure
"equal" access and usage by persons in wheelchairs or medical advances would be such that
people would no longer require wheelchairs. The fact is, though, that today one is the majority
and one is the minority and that while there have been changes to improve accessibility to
public life for people in wheelchairs over the last decade or so, there is currently only limited
accommodation of the needs of those of us using wheelchairs for mobility.
50. This is the pattern that is still followed more or less with respect to minority religious
education, except for religious education guaranteed under section 93 of the Constitution Act,
1867. Education in itself is a public matter and the provinces expect anyone teaching children
to satisfy the curriculum requirements established; yet this can be done in a number of ways
and children are not required to attend specific schools if the requirements are otherwise met.
But the province will not usually support these other forms of education. It neither forbids nor
encourages them (it "tolerates" them) and it is in that sense "neutral" about them. The
alternative approach is that of the "charter" schools which may be seen as a privatization of the
school system in the guise of supporting difference.
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dence, is that difference is to be taken into account, although there
continues to be debate about the extent to which difference is or should
be recognized (both from those who seek to have difference recognized
and those who consider we may have "gone too far" in recognizing
differences), a debate which echoes the older debate about the proper
relationship between liberty and equality. Nonetheless, we can speak in
rough terms about the movement in Canada from toleration with respect
to cultural (and other) differences to non-discrimination (that is, access
to various public services is open to all, but no positive steps are taken to
promote difference) to affirmation (the promotion of difference).5 As
Kane (following Raz) describes affirmation, it
transcends the individualistic approach of nondiscrimination and asserts
the value of groups possessing and maintaining their distinct cultures
within the larger community; the affirmatively multicultural society not
only permits but actively encourages and assists different cultures to
preserve their separate identities as best they can.52
This notion of affirmation underlies the concept and practice of
substantive equality. It describes in a fundamental way the structure of
society and the interrelationships among communities within it. As
federalism describes an important manifestation of the institutional
structuring of Canada, so substantive equality describes an important
manifestation of the human structuring of Canada. Canada is a self-
consciously pluralist society which tends to incorporation of heterogene-
ity in law and official practice, not to assimilate difference, but to reflect
it. The degree to which any country is successful in achieving its
theoretical model is debatable, but I speak here of commitment and not
realization. Canada must be included among pluralist societies, since
many official practices and the legal system both incorporate the need to
recognize and respond to "difference."
The recognition of "difference"--me from you, you from me, and both
of us from others-is, I would argue, a fundamental governing principle
of Canadian society today, if not of liberal societies generally; imper-
fectly realized, to be sure, but nevertheless one of the measures by which
51. John Kane, "From Ethnic Exclusion to Ethnic Diversity: The Australian Path to
Multiculturalism" in Shapiro & Kymlicka, eds., supra note 41 at 540-41. The terminology
refers to "a progression of liberal responses to 'multiculturalism"' as identified by Joseph Raz
and adopted by Kane.
52. Ibid. at 542. I make one quick observation here about the "affirmative society" (to be
pursued later): this describes Canada not only with respect to "multicultural" groups, but also
with respect to other grounds of difference, particularly sex and to some extent disability.
Certainly, however, there has not been a uniform progression and we have not yet passed
through even tolerance with respect to some differences.
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the society is judged. This recognition that the moral worth of each
individual cannot be acknowledged or realized in the same way has
enormous implications for the ordering of society. Some notion of
substantive equality is today, as is formal equality, a fundamental part of
the conceptual framework of Canadian society. The contrast between the
two forms of equality is this: formal equality insists that differences be
ignored; substantive equality insists that where appropriate differences
be taken into account.53 Thus the importance of substantive equality in
contemporary Canadian society is akin to the importance of values which
have been acknowledged as fundamental constitutional principles.
3. Recognition as a Foundational Principle
Although substantive equality plays a significant role in the ordering of
Canadian society, it may not be clear why this translates into the need for
recognition as a separate or distinct foundational constitutional principle.
There are possibly three main arguments one might posit against the
recognition of substantive equality as an underlying principle. These are
that we already have an equality guarantee and therefore do not need
anything more; that equality is already recognized in the rule of law and
we do not need anything more (or, alternatively, we can extend the
meaning of equality in the rule of law to include substantive equality); and
we already have a constitutional principle of minority rights and therefore
we do not need anything more (that is, the recognition of substantive
equality would be redundant). I want to address each of these objections
with the objective of showing why, valuable though each of section 15,
the rule of law and respect for minority rights is, substantive equality adds
something new and necessary to the mix.
53. There are many examples of how difference is taken into account in organizing society.
One need think only of publicly funded religious-based schooling, affirmative action pro-
grams, minority language provisions, wheelchair accessible sidewalks and public transporta-
tion or aboriginal policy to see how various needs and historical experience have been
"accommodated" to some extent in Canada. More importantly, these have become in many
instances simply the way we organize our society-simply one form of "normal" arrange-
ments. This is the practice of disassembling the norm to which I refer below. The responses vary
from country to country, as well as in their permanence or vulnerability to elimination, but in
all liberal-democratic countries there are some ways in which "difference" of some sort is
reflected in fact in the society's structuring. Even in the United States where there is greater
resistance to integrating difference, tribal courts and the Americans With Disabilities Act are
just two ways in which "difference" is recognized, albeit not without controversy in the case
of the former. For a variety of ways in which difference has been recognized or which have been
the subject of proposals, see Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 42. For a typology of eight approaches
to "accommodating ethnic and linguistic pluralism," see Jacob T. Levy, "Classifying Cultural
Rights" in Shapiro & Kymlicka, supra note 41 at 22, 25. Levy provides some Canadian
examples and where he does not, it is not difficult to think of them.
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a. Why Nothing Else Satisfies
i. We Already have an Equality Guarantee
Since Canada already has an explicit constitutional guarantee of substan-
tive equality, one may wonder why recognition of afoundational consti-
tutional principle is necessary. If one asks this question of equality,
however, one must ask it of most of the principles since many of them
have corresponding explicit guarantees, as indicated above. As with other
principles and "their" express guarantees, a substantive equality founda-
tional principle would serve a different constitutional purpose than its
corresponding express guarantee in the written constitution. Founda-
tional principles attract a different type of analysis from that required
under the explicit guarantees. In the case of substantive equality, a
foundational substantive equality would not be subject to either section
15's wording which is tied to the anti-discrimination approach or by the
structural requirements of an express guarantee. Among these are the
need in the usual case for individual parties, the impact of section 1 which
allows governments tojustify their discriminatory legislation and actions
and the development of a "formula" upon which to base the analysis, in
this case the two-stage analysis developed in Andrews and subsequently
refined. This is not unique to substantive equality. It is equally true of all
the foundational principles: each attracts a different analysis in a different
context from that in which the court engages with respect to any
corresponding express guarantee.
A more significant answer to why an explicit guarantee does not
suffice or even precludes recognition of a constitutional principle which
encompasses the same value lies in the role foundational constitutional
principles play in a country governed by constitutional supremacy: as I
have already indicated fundamental constitutional principles have a
significance beyond that of specific constitutional provisions. An anal-
ogy may be found in the Supreme Court of Canada's consideration of
judicial independence in the Provincial Judges Reference. Although
section 11 (d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
for the independence of provincial court judges, and sections 96-100 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 for the independence of superior court judges,
Lamer C.J. (speaking for six of the seven judges who heard the matter)
stated that "judicial independence is at root an unwritten constitutional
principle, in the sense that it is exterior to the particular sections of the
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Constitution Acts. '54 Its scope and significance are accordingly height-
ened. As a fundamental constitutional principle, it applies to the actions
of courts and governments, regardless of whether their actions fall within
the confines of the relevant express constitutional guarantees. In the
particular instance of provincial judges' judicial independence, for ex-
ample, section 11 (d) applies only to criminal courts (that is, it is a right
which can be claimed only by persons charged with an offence) while
sections 96-100 applies only to superior courts: thus the provincial or
inferior civil courts fall into a gap since they are encompassed neither by
the provision which applies to the inferior courts nor by the provisions
which apply to civil courts. In this case, the foundational constitutional
principle ofjudicial independence fills the gap left by the combination of
the express provisions. This is very much an example of judicial "consti-
tution-making." The legislators responsible for sections 96-100 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 did not contemplate that judges of the provincial
courts should have the same protections (and, in turn, that those appearing
before them would have the same protections) of judicial independence
as did the judges of the superior courts and the persons who appeared
before them. This distinction arose from adoption or inheritance of the
British principles which did not have to account for "provincially
appointed courts." The drafters of the Charter extended the protection to
matters which involve, in the most obvious sense, the state versus the
individual, that is, criminal matters. Furthermore, even the judges who
agreed with the extension of the judicial independence principle accepted
that section 11 (d) of the Charter was sufficient to dispose of the question
before them. Nevertheless, the fundamental constitutional principle of
judicial independence now applies to all provincial court judges and, it
appears indeed, since then, to justices of the peace in Ontario." The
express provision and the constitutional principle are, of course, related,
but the existence of the former does not mean that the latter will not be
recognized, applied or even go beyond the express provisions.
54. Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 2, at 63-64 (emphasis in original). The decision
actually relies on the operation of section 11 (d) of the Charter, however, since the parties argued
it on that basis, and the Chief Justice's comments are, strictly speaking, obiter. Section 11 (d)
states that "Any person charged with an offence has the right... to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal."
55. Re Ontario Federation of Justices of the Peace Associations v. The Queen in Right of
Ontario (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 541 (Div. Ct.).
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The difference between the scope of a constitutional principle and
explicit constitutional guarantees may also be illustrated by the unsuc-
cessful claim made by native women in Canada to participate in the
constitutional talks which culminated in the Charlottetown Accord.56
The federal Government had granted certain native groups financial
support in connection with the constitutional proceedings, involvement
in a consultation process and subsequent participation in the process to
prepare constitutional amendments. A portion of the money had to be
spent on women's issues. The Native Women's Association of Canada
claimed that the failure to include them and to give them funding directly
contravened their freedom of expression and equality guarantees in the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms. The claim reflected the doubt
among many native women about whether the male leaders who domi-
nated the four groups who had been recognized would adequately
represent their interests with respect to any proposal with respect to
aboriginal self-government; in particular, they wanted to be sure that the
Charter of Rights would apply to aboriginal self-government.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that there was no
obligation on the government to fund or consult anyone, except where the
provision of funds to one group infringed the expression of another group
(not the case here, according to the Court), and that, in any event, the
native women had many opportunities to express their views; their
argument that the funded groups advocated a male-dominated form of
self-government was rejected. McLachlin J. was the only justice explic-
itly to take the position that the Charter does not apply to governments in
their decisions to fund their advisors, but her colleagues' analysis indicate
that it would be extremely difficult to establish a contravention of an
explicit Charter guarantee in the context of public consultation. While
consideration of this issue under the framework of fundamental constitu-
tional principles would not necessarily result in a different outcome,5 7 the
dynamics of the analysis would be quite different.
56. Native Women's Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627. The Charlottetown
Accord contained wide-ranging proposals for constitutional amendments; it was defeated in a
(with one provincial exception) national referendum in October 1992 (Quebec held its own
referendum in which the Accord was defeated). The Federal Court, Trial Division dismissed
the application, but the Federal Court of Appeal declared that the women's freedom of
expression and equal guarantees under section 28 of the Charter had been contravened:[ 1992]
3 F.C. 192 (F.C.A.), allowing appeal from ajudgment of the Trial Division, [1992] 2 F.C. 462.
57. I want to be clear that my argument is not intended to provide an "end run" around section
15 (or section 2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but rather to suggest the kind of case
that is not easily dealt with as a section 15 case, but would be appropriately considered within
the context of a fundamental substantive equality principle.
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1 merely want to suggest the nature of that analysis here. It is highly
significant that the matter at issue was involvement in constitutional
consultation and talks: this is the epitome of democratic participation, one
mark of the broad notion of citizenship to which I referred earlier. This
situation attracts the fundamental principles of democracy, respect for
minority rights (or of a possible principle of respect for aboriginal
interests) and given aboriginal self-government issues, of federalism.
Analyzed in this way, post-Quebec Secession Reference, something
capable of interpretation as government "largesse" might become an
obligation. It is doubtful, on the other hand, that the native groups to
whom the government had given funding would have been successful had
they been forced to take their case for participation to court under the
Charter, using the analysis in the Native Women's Association case.
Thus the initial question of whether there is some "obligation" 8 to
include various groups, including native groups, in constitutional talks
would implicate the democratic principle and probably, the principle of
protection of minority rights or aboriginal rights. Assuming that this
analysis results in an acceptance that certain groups, at least, should be
consulted by the government or should have a place at the negotiating
table, the next question is which particular groups or which members of
58. At the least this is a constitutional or moral obligation; it is less clear that it is a legal
obligation since the Supreme Court of Canada was ambiguous on the legal (as opposed to
constitutional) status of the fundamental principles, saying both that these principles had legal
status but, as some commentators have thought, they would not enforce them. Speaking
generally, the Court said in the Quebec Secession Reference that "[u]nderlying constitutional
principles may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have 'full
legal force', as we described it in the Patriation Reference.. .), which constitute substantive
limitations upon government action... The principles are ... binding upon both courts and
governments": supra note 2 at 249. On the other hand, the Court also said they had "clarif[ied]
the legal framework," but that the political actors would have to reconcile the different
constitutional interests and "[t]o the extent issues addressed in the course of negotiation [with
respect to Quebec's claim to secession] are political, the courts, appreciating their proper role
in the constitutional scheme, would have no supervisory role:" ibid. at 295. These two
statements can be reconciled, however, if the Court means that they are not concerned with the
details, but are prepared to enforce the failure to observe the constitutional factors which set
the parameters of the negotiations. That is, their concern in this regard, at least, is for process,
rather than for content, although the two are often closely interrelated.
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a more widely defined group should be included.5 9 Here (if not at an
earlier stage of the analysis) a substantive equality principle would play
a significant role. It would require consideration of whether native
women's interests might be distinct from those of the male-dominated
native groups: taking account of the intersecting interests of particular
communities is at the heart of a substantive equality analysis and the
recent historical record indicates that a substantial number of native
women struggle with that intersection between their commitment to their
aboriginal identity and their treatment as women within their aboriginal
communities.
ii. Equality is Already Recognized in the Rule of Law
Currently, the only equality with status as a foundational constitutional
principle is formal equality as it has developed in the rule of law. 60 It is
correct to say that the concept of equality has been recognized as an
element in the constitutional framework for at least one hundred and fifty
years: since the development of liberal notions of the rule of law, the equal
application of the law has been one of its elements. Stated simply, the
principle is that the law applies to everyone regardless of status or station.
This principle of legal equality is meant to ensure that people's status will
not assist them in avoiding the consequences of their actions. Legal
equality is a sine qua non of a regime purporting to operate in accordance
with the rule of law. The glory of this principle lies in its ostensible
neutrality: the "sovereign," no less than you or I, must abide by the law
and be answerable to it." It is as important today as it has always been,
59. l am making this assumption for the sake of argument, but roughly the case would take
this form: the democracy principle "requires a continuous process of discussion" (perhaps
primarily by different levels of government, but not exclusively) and to the consideration of
"dissenting voices": Quebec Secession Reference, ibid. at 256. If governments are to be
representative, they must ensure that they establish means to take into account all types of
voices and views. This is reinforced by the need to take into account the "protection of minority
rights" or, as an independent principle, "protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights":
ibid. at 262. In addition, however, a substantive equality principle would demand a consider-
ation of the extent to which the concerns of various members of a "minority" (or of aboriginal
peoples) are being satisfactorily expressed: in short, to what extent is a minority's (or aboriginal
people's) own heterogeneity recognized?
60. Formal equality is a component of the rule of law. Although it may not always be phrased
in quite this way, it is an essential part of the bundle of processes or values which comprise the
rule of law. It refers to the equal coverage of law: it applies to everyone and it is to be applied
consistently or "fairly." It is this aspect of the rule of law to which I refer in using the term
"formal equality."
61. Possibly the most passionate statement or application of this principle in Canadian
jurisprudence occurs in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, supra note 3. Premier Duplessis had inter-
vened to ensure that Mr. Roncarelli would be denied a liquor licence for his restaurant because
the restauranteur had posted security for bail for Jehovah's Witnesses whose activities were the
subject of a campaign by the provincial authorities (the Witnesses' beliefs were viewed as
insulting to Roman Catholics). Premier Duplessis evidently considered himself above the law.
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for the temptations of power have not diminished. But it has not changed
since it was first articulated: it remains a formal equality which empha-
sizes treating everyone in the same way.62 Given its context, this may well
be appropriate, but it no longer reflects our understanding of equality
which is more comprehensive than it was over a hundred years ago when
formal (legal) equality was first articulated.
Formal equality is crucial in requiring all to obey the law, especially
those in power-this statement of legal equality underlies our legal
system, but it fails to acknowledge that law affects people differently. The
importance of legal equality in the development of a constitutional
democracy is not to be gainsaid. Today, however, this statement of
equality, while necessary, is, alone, inadequate and unreflective of social
reality. Rather than a reassuring statement of the inclusionary, non-
hierarchical nature of law, it appears, on its own, to be exclusionary. A
contemporary statement of fundamental constitutional principles-the
principles which underlie all our legislation, legal procedures and gov-
ernment action and which comprise the constitutional framework-must
recognize the multivariate nature of the communities subject to the same
law. A neutral law may impose additional burdens on some because of
their skin colour or fail to provide its benefits because of their gender.
Therefore it is not sufficient to say only that the law applies equally to all:
it must apply in a manner which is equally meaningful for all. Thus
equality as a core constitutional principle be recognized as going beyond
this formal "rule of law equality" to a distinct substantive equality
principle in order to reflect changing social realities in keeping with the
necessary evolution of constitutional principles.
Perhaps, then, we should change the meaning of equality in the rule of
law? In many ways, this is an appealing approach since it merely asks that
an already clearly recognized principle evolve to meet the demands of
contemporary times. The rule of law is a deeply rooted constitutional
principle inherited from the United Kingdom through the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867. It has already evolved, since in Canada the
principle is no longer tied, as it was in 1867, to the doctrine of parliamen-
tary supremacy.63 Considering the legitimacy of law, indeed, it is appro-
priate to bring to bear a substantive understanding of equality: law is
legitimate and deserves to be obeyed when it recognizes that not everyone
62. Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 3 at 748 and Quebec Secession
Reference, supra note 2 at 258.
63. The content of the rule of law will almost certainly be inferred from a country's legal
culture, respecting the rights which are "part of the backbone of the legal culture, part of its
fundamental traditions:" Joseph Raz, "The Politics of the Rule of Law" (1990) 3 Ratio Juris
331, 337.
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can be treated in the same way. But this is rather different from saying that
everyone is obliged to obey the law regardless of their position in life; in
this sense treating people equally is to say that no one is above the law.
This principle in a democracy has value in and of itself and it is still
needed: in this context the emphasis is on ensuring that those who may
have the means to avoid law do not avoid it. This statement about formal
equality is far from outmoded, but treating people in the same way is
outmoded in other contexts in which it is appropriate to take difference
into account. Rather than redefining formal equality, therefore, it is
preferable to acknowledge the need to recognize the concomitant sub-
stantive form of equality with each applied in the appropriate case.
iii. Is Equality Just Another Word for "Minority Rights?"
The recognition of a foundational constitutional principle of substantive
equality may seem simply another way of embedding in the constitutional
framework the values inherent in the protection of minority rights.
Therefore, it might be argued, it could bring little to the analysis which
that recently articulated principle could not bring. There is, of course, an
equality component to "minority rights." The Court's admittedly brief
discussion of this principle seems to define it with regard to group or
collective rights, including possibly aboriginal rights.' The principle of
democracy also "accommodates cultural and group identities," although
not surprisingly given the context in which this comment is made (the
"rules" governing negotiation over Quebec secession), this appears to be
related to self-government. 65 Many of the principles reflect similar
values, however; nor does identification of a similar or related principle
mean that there might not still be a need for a distinct articulation of a
particular doctrine, as was the case with the addition of the protection of
minority interests, despite a related element in democracy.
Inevitably, if the Constitution possesses a coherence, there will be
considerable overlap among the constitutional principles. One might
argue, for example, that political expression is simply a concomitant of
democracy, deriving from the association between democracy and the
need for public information and widespread debate of ideas, yet it has
status as a free-standing principle. Similarly, although aboriginal rights
might seem (in a general sense, at least) to be a type of minority right, the
Supreme Court has said that it might be an independent principle and
there is much to be said for this approach: although minority and
aboriginal rights share much in common (they both represent a place
64. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 261, 262, 269.
65. Ibid. at 254. Federalism is also in part a response to "diversity": ibid. at 244, 252.
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carved out from the homogenous character of the country), it is the
differences (primarily in the claim by aboriginal peoples to be "peoples")
between them that matters. The same may be said of protection of
minority rights and a substantive equality principle. Both principles
address difference, both address participation and recognition. Yet mi-
nority rights cannot avoid the dichotomy inherent in the name, that
between the minority and the majority; minorities are "fixed," refer to
clearly set parameters and tend towards "institutionalized" recognition in
(for example) minority language or education rights. It is true that they do
not need to be so limited and no doubt they will not be. Nevertheless, the
minority rights principle does not capture the fluid and flexible nature of
substantive equality which pays at least as much, if not more, attention to
the individual as the group. Most importantly, substantive equality seeks
to remove the notion of hierarchy or of "the norm" which is effectively
inherent in majority-minority relations. The minority rights principle is
about "protection"; the substantive equality principle would be about
transformation.
Reference to the Native Women'sAssociation case is again useful, this
time to illustrate the difference between the protection for minorities
principle and a substantive equality principle. While a minorities (or
better in this context, an aboriginal) principle would capture the interests
of aboriginal peoples generally, it is less adequate in providing an
appropriate shelter for aboriginal women in relation to aboriginal men
(that is, from those who "dissent" from those who claim to be "the norm").
Yet this is precisely what the substantive equality principle would do: it
would permit a framework for analysis of differing views within a
particular "group" (minority or aboriginal people). In the context of
something like the constitutional talks, the application of the substantive
equality constitutional principle would invoke questions about the legiti-
macy of any results from a process which had ignored this history.
The recognition of the protection of minority rights is important not
only in itself, but also because it indicates the Court's willingness to
develop a contemporary "list" of constitutional principles responsive to
Canada's current social reality and because it evidences a consciousness
about the fundamental status of equality type principles. But it differs
from substantive equality not only in content, but because it does not, as
does substantive equality, provide a process of analysis or interpretation
of government action. Substantive equality provides a means not only by
which equality seekers may have their experiences reflected in policy, but
also by which government action can be assessed for conformity with the
constitutional framework.
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Consideration of alternatives to a freestanding substantive equality
principle serves to highlight what is different about substantive equality
from other principles and what would be different about the foundational
principle compared to the explicit guarantee. Changing the meaning of
equality in the rule of law would hide the continuing significance of
formal equality in the appropriate context; nor should an explicit guaran-
tee be confused with the role of a foundational principle, any more than
it is with judicial independence or political speech. Substantive equality
deserves the same level of recognition as a fundamental constitutional
principle as does political speech or respect for minority rights; like
aboriginal rights (which I maintain should have independent status) 66 , it
shares something in common with an already recognized principle (in
both cases, protection of minority rights and in the case of equality, the
rule of law), yet demands recognition on its own terms as a foundational
constitutional principle.
b. The Special Contribution of the Substantive Equality Principle
A substantive equality principle would speak to the process of contem-
porary constitutionalism. James Tully has cited the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as an example of "presumed, culture-blind liberal
constitutionalism" which has been imposed as a reflection of "the
imperial imposition of a pan-Canadian culture" over "the distinct cultural
ways" of Quebec, Aboriginal peoples, women and the provinces.67
Whether the Charter's wording is and its interpretation has been more
complex than Tully suggests in at least some respects, inevitably as a
constitutional document the Charter is based in large measure on an
assumption of sufficient "commonality" (or "heterogeneity") to form a
single political entity, just as the Constitution as a whole is. 68 The
substantive equality principle I have proposed leavens the constitution's
homogeneity, although I do not argue here that it changes the constitution
from one which is essentially liberal to one that is post-liberal. Neverthe-
less, it would contribute significantly to the kind of "just form of
Constitution" which Tully contrasts with the "neutral" Constitution
66. In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court suggests that respect for aboriginal fights
might be an element of respect for minority rights or might be a free standing right: supra note
2 at 262-63. For reasons I have indicated, I hold the view that it is sufficiently distinct to warrant
the latter of these possibilities.
67. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 7.
68. Indeed, one might argue that the Charter imposes a less homogeneous vision than does
the rest of the Constitution, but if so, this is perhaps still a question of degree rather than kind.
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which has been predominant in the past and which was consistent with
liberalism's earlier "neutrality" on the question of difference. I would
argue, moreover, that the Canadian Constitution, through judicial inter-
pretation, has gradually been moving beyond this "neutrality" towards
"the full mutual recognition of the different cultures of its citizens, ' 69 a
process which is not only compatible with a substantive equality prin-
ciple, but is aided by it.70
Applied to institutions, as well as to "citizens," substantive equality
would bring to bear considerations of the mutuality and interaction
requisite in both institutional and individual actors. I have primarily
considered the value of this principle for individuals or communities
based on personal characteristics; however, it would also have an impact
on institutional arrangements. For example, it would seem to me to
support an asymmetrical federalism which acknowledges the fundamen-
tally different needs of Quebec without resulting in the feared
"balkanization" of Canada. It might, for example, be brought to bear in
considering the legitimacy of the constitutional structure implied by the
Calgary Declaration with its assertions of sameness in the treatment of
provinces. 1 Similarly, as I have already suggested, it might have a role
to play in interpreting federalism with respect to the Nisga' a governance.
I next explore the meaning of substantive equality and how it might be
applied. Although I begin with the treatment of equality under section 15
of the Charter, as developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, for reasons
I explain, the section 15 jurisprudence can constitute only that-an
already established start to the kind of content a substantive equality
needs to be meaningful.
69. Tully, supra note 67 at 8.
70. This is, I recognize, a large proposition but in its defence I point to the articulation of other
fundamental principles, such as minority rights and the "reformulation" of principles such as
federalism from one encompassing institutional relations to one also addressing citizen
relations, the recognition of oral evidence as "legitimate" evidence in aboriginal rights cases
and the legitimacy accorded the secession of Quebec under certain conditions. On oral
evidence, see Delmaguukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; and on the legitimacy
of secession, see the Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2. On the change from a
"government's constitution" to a "citizens' constitution," see the views of Alan Cairns, esp. in
Douglas E. Williams, ed., Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change.
Selected Essays by Alan C. Cairns (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995).
71. Article 2 of the Calgary Declaration states that the provinces enjoy "equality of status."
The Declaration was agreed to by all premiers of the "English-speaking" provinces on 17
September 1997.
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4. Thoughts on the Inquiry Required by a Fundamental Constitutional
Principle of Substantive Equality
The concept of equality is complex and "elusive." 2 As a justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada has phrased it, "[t]he quest for equality
expresses some of humanity's highest ideals and aspirations, which are
by their nature abstract and subject to differing articulations."73 At a less
exalted level, "[t]he principle of equality before the law has long been
recognized as a feature of our [Canadian] constitutional tradition." The
express guarantee of equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms "'rests on the moral and ethical principle
fundamental to a truly free and democratic society that all persons should
be treated by the law on a footing of equality with equal concern and
respect."' 7 5 It goes beyond formal equality to guarantee substantive
equality.
76
My primary purpose in this section is to raise the kind of concerns
which might be considered in delineating the parameters of a founda-
tional constitutional principle of substantive equality. In doing that I draw
on the considerable literature extant in the area of equality. As with any
of the principles, its meaning would evolve and would be affected by the
specific context in which the principle would be considered. Because this
concept has already been given content by the Supreme Court, however,
it is possible to articulate at least some elements which are a sine qua non
of the concept. For this, I draw on the Court's own jurisprudence.
The most important aspect of the concept of substantive equality is the
taking into consideration the differences among people which might
require different treatment in order to achieve equality. This aspect
highlights the distinction between substantive and formal equality, that
is, between emphasizing difference and emphasizing sameness. Yet they
both address the goal of eliminating the gap between the powerful and the
powerless or between the rich and the poor, the one by curtailing the
power of the rich, the other by curtailing the disadvantage of the poor.
72. Andrews, supra note 42 at 164 (McIntyre J.).
73. Law, supra note 42 at 507 (lacobucci J. for the Court).
74. Andrews, supra note 42 at 170. As McIntyre J. pointed out, this concept of equality,
known as formal equality, had received statutory recognition in the Canadian Bill of Rights
where its limitations became only too readily apparent.
75. Ibid. at 171, quoting Chief Justice Howland in Reference Re An Act to Amend the
Education Act (1986), 53 O.R.(2d) 513 (C.A.). The notion of equal respect and worth is echoed
in other section 15 cases: see, for example, Vriend v. Alberta, supra note 38 at 535, and Law,
supra note 42 at 530.
76. Law, supra note 42 at 517-18, 527.
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The notion of "affirmation of difference" captures the essence of
substantive equality.77 There are significant differences between the
claims of autonomy or self-government (as made by aboriginal peoples)
and claims to full participation in "mainstream" society, the larger society
(as made by most ethnically-identified groups, persons with disabilities
and "women"78 ). In the latter case, this would be a claim premised on a
restructured society which recognizes the distinctive characteristics of
those who are excluded in different ways (and to a different extent) as an
integral part of the society, instead of abnormal or "different."79 It is
important to recognize that one of the characteristics of substantive
equality is that it can encompass a variety of forms of difference and
mutual recognition.80
The "taking account of difference" which lies at the heart of substan-
tive equality had been well-established as a principle by the time section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect in
1985 because it had already been developed in case law under human
rights legislation. It and other similar developments were immediately
incorporated into the interpretation of section 15 inAndrews, the first case
decided under section 15, and have constituted part of the meaning given
to "equality" in section 15 since then. Nevertheless, the meaning of
equality developed under section 15 is, I would argue, inadequate for a
foundational principle of equality because of its reliance on the concept
of discrimination. In this regard, the concept of substantive equality
comprising a foundational principle can build on the interpretation of
77. In considering this concept, Kane addresses only the claims of multicultural groups which
seek inclusion in society and therefore not with groups seeking self-rule or sovereignty
(specifically, indigenous peoples): supra notes 51 and 52.
78. "Women" may constitute a distinct group for many purposes, but they may well be
making claims which overlap with other claims based on, for example, ethnicity, ability, class
or sexuality or may be making distinctive claims within these other communities.
79. Kymlicka makes a similar distinction: supra note 39 at 64. Cf. Tully who would class all
claims for cultural recognition as instances of a claim to self-rule ("to rule themselves in accord
with their customs and ways"), even though the form it takes may divide roughly as I have
described it: Tully, supra note 67 at 4-5. These are not easy determinations; thus while usually
persons with disabilities want to eliminate the (irrelevant) barriers that prevent them from
participating fully in society, persons who subscribe to the Deaf culture have a very different
outlook, the heart of which is, perhaps not surprisingly, language: Kymlicka, supra note 39 at
93-95.
80. Tully views constitutional "mutual recognition" as an element of (indeed, perhaps as the
defining characteristic of) post-liberal constitutionalism: supra note 67. Fukuyama calls this
a form of liberalism: "For Hegel, by contrast [with Hobbes and Locke for whom "[1liberal
society is ... a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens not to interfere with each other's
lives and property], liberal society is a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to
mutually recognize each other... [Hegelian liberalism is] the pursuit of rational recognition,
that is, recognition on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and
autonomous human being is recognized by all": Fukuyama, supra note 40 at 200.
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section 15, but would not be limited by the actual wording of the
provision, in the same way that the meaning given to the principle of
judicial independence is reflected in the explicit provisions of the
Constitution Acts but is not limited by them.
In many respects the Supreme Court of Canada has already indicated
that it has an understanding of substantive equality grounded in an
appropriate recognition of the interrelation between sameness and differ-
ence." As I have already indicated, from the beginning the Court was
cognizant of the significance of the difference in wording between
section 15 of the Charter and section 1 of the Bill of Rights, as well as of
the relevance of advances in anti-discrimination jurisprudence.82 A brief
review of the section 15 jurisprudence helps to illustrate the characteris-
tics of the substantive equality concept I am proposing. As I have already
explained, in rehearsing the section 15 jurisprudence my intent is not to
suggest that it constitute the content of a core constitutional principle of
substantive equality. Inevitably, however, it will inform the judges'
appreciation of a core principle and its desirable and less desirable
elements are worth consideration both for that reason and because it can,
in a sense, serve as a foil in developing the broader principle. 3
Underlying the analysis developed in Andrews and subsequent cases
is the view that "[t]he promotion of equality entails the promotion of a
society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized
81. American courts have been less responsive to this invitation than have Canadian judges:
Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, "Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical
Way" (1997) 76 Washington U. L. Q. 105.
82. Section 15 guarantees equality "before and under the law" and 'the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law," while the Bill of Rights recognizes "equality before the law and the
protection of the law." The status of the Bill of Rights as an ordinary statute and the wording
("It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to
exist [specified rights and freedoms]"), as well as the interpretation clause which required
courts to interpret legislation in a manner which did not contravene the Bill of Rights
(contrasted with the courts' power to strike down legislation inconsistent with the Charter)
resulted in a narrow and stultifying application of the Bill: Canada (Attorney-General) v.
Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693; Bliss v.A.G. Can., [1979]
1 S.C.R. 183; MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370. In fact, the first hint of the new
direction came before the Court had an opportunity to consider section 15 itself. Dickson C.J.
observed in Big M Drug Mart, which involved a challenge to the Lord's Day Act under section
2(a) of the Charter, the guarantee of freedom of religion, that "the interests of true equality may
well require differentiation in treatment": R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [ 198511 S.C.R. 295 at 347.
83. Critical assessments of the section 15 jurisprudence abound: see, for example, Bakan,
supra note 1, esp. 48ff; Dianne Pothier, "M'Aider, Mayday: Section 15 of the Charter in
Distress" (1996) 6 N.J.C.L. 295; David M. Beatty, "The Canadian Conception of Equality"
(1996) U.T.L.J. 349. Also see Frances Henry & Carol Tator, "State Policy and Practices as
Racialized Discourse: Multiculturalism, the Charter, and Employment Equity," in Li, ed.,
supra note 39, esp. 99-103. For examples of arguments advanced under section 15, see
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Equality and the Charter: Ten Years of Feminist
Advocacy Before the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1996).
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at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and
consideration. 84 In practice, that recognition entails acknowledging that
"identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality."85 By
1982 the courts had acknowledged that the intention to treat someone
unequally (or in a discriminatory fashion) is irrelevant, that superficially
neutral legislation or conduct may nevertheless result in inequality,86 that
differences among groups may be as important as differences between
groups and that in either case, different treatment may be required to
satisfy equality.87 These are all important characteristics of a substantive
approach to equality, both with respect to an explicit constitutional
guarantee and to a foundational principle. They were adopted as part of
the interpretation of section 15 inAndrews in 1989 and have remained as
the core of the Court's approach, despite some serious divergences with
potential-perhaps now overcome-to undermine the more progressive
aspects of the Court's approach in Andrews.88
In some respects, the nature of the inquiry which courts will undertake
with respect to a foundational equality, as they must undertake with the
other foundational principles, is a "dialogue" about the nature of a society
through the legal lens.89 Thus the substantive equality principle is a major
tool in the process of one aspect of this dialogue, as "culturally diverse
sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on
their ways of association over time in accord with the conventions of
84. Andrews, supra note 42 at 171. The Court has been criticized for forgetting this principle
in cases such as Symes and Thibaudeau in which the circumstances of individual women were
assessed from the point of view of their family status: Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695;
Thibaudeau v. Canada, [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 627. For an example of this criticism, see Claire F.L.
Young, "It's All in the Family: Child Support, Tax, and Thibaudeau" (1995) 6 Constitutional
Forum 107.
85. Andrews, supra note 42 at 164.
86. This was most recently confirmed under section 15 of the Charter in Eldridge v. British
Columbia (Attorney-General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
87. Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [ 1997] 1 S.C.R. 241; also see Weatherall v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
88. While acknowledging that there had been some dispute about the appropriate interpreta-
tion of section 15, Mr. Justice lacobucci confirmed in Law that "there has been and continues
to be general consensus regarding the basic principles relating to the purpose of s. 15(1) and the
proper approach to equality analysis... ": Law, supra note 42 at 509. His Lordship might be
said to gloss too easily over the differences in approach; on the other hand, the Court seems to
be saying in Law that it has effectively rejected the more restrictive "relevancy" approach
followed by four members of the Court in Egan, supra note 38 and Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 418.
89. On this notion of "dialogue," see Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relation-
ship" in Jonathan Hart & Richard W. Bauman, eds., Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 67, 80-81.
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mutual recognition, consent and continuity."9 Equality claims (which in
essence are about being treated with dignity and respect) will be contra-
dictory and it will not always be possible to reconcile the conflicts; judges
will have to make choices. This power in judges is, of course, the thing
that gives some people pause and it is almost impossible to avoid the
expression of their own subjective views. This is inherent in the nature of
constitutionalism, however. In making decisions about the impact of a
substantive equality foundational principle, as they do in all cases
involving foundational principles, judges will take into account the other
principles and explicit constitutional guarantees, as well as the legislative
preferences, especially in cases where there are a number of alternative
policies which can meet constitutional standards.
In a liberal society, it is impossible to avoid the problem that some
practices are inconsistent with basic liberal principles.9' This is clearly a
formidable task. It will sometimes be the case that some of the differences
are significantly at odds with the general pattern. For example, if the
general pattern is designed to enhance "equality," as I suggest should be
the case, what does one do with "customary patterns" based on the
subordination of some members of the group to others? That liberalism
cannot tolerate intolerance is especially true when unequal practices are
being challenged in court as contravening some right or are being used to
defend inequality. While the practices of private groups are less amenable
to challenge as a constitutional matter, government's willingness to
permit or tolerate them in the name of pluralism may be. The more diverse
the society and the more diversity is accepted, the more likely such
challenges are likely to occur, requiring consideration of the interrelation
between different foundational principles, even between a principle of
substantive equality and that of protection of minority rights.
While acknowledging the "difference argument" in Andrews, the
Supreme Court of Canada did not seriously struggle with this view of
equality until it had its first significant disability case. In Eaton v. Brant
County Board of Education, Mr. Justice Sopinka, for the majority,
recognized that for some persons with disabilities "[e]xclusion from the
90. Tully, supra note 67 at 184. Tully describes these conventions as "norms that come into
being and come to be accepted as authoritative in the course of constitutional practice,
including criticism and contestation of that practice": ibid. at 116. He contends that "[i]f they
guide constitutional negotiations, the negotiations and resulting constitutions will be just with
respect to cultural recognition": ibid. at 117.
91. Robert Justin Lipkin, "Can Liberalism Justify Multiculturalism?" (1997) 45 Buffalo L.
Rev. 1.
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mainstream of society results [in part] from the construction of a society
based solely on 'mainstream' attributes to which disabled persons will
never be able to gain access." The importance of a contextual analysis is
brought home by these cases in a way it was not previously, for it is true
that "segregation can be both protective of equality and violative of
equality depending upon the person and the state of disability." 92 Yet
even this may not capture what it means to treat someone with respect and
to pursue an "equality of well-being" which is premised on the right of
people to make choices. 93 One may say, however, that judges do under-
stand that they should take into account the complainant's perspective, 94
another important aspect of a substantive equality.
A fully realized substantive equality concept requires an appreciation
of the flexibility and overlapping nature of identity and of the distinction
between an externally imposed and an internally derived identity. Here
the structure of section 15 and its roots, through wording and interpreta-
tion, in human rights or anti-discrimination jurisprudence make it less
useful as a guide. Human rights legislation is based on a site-specific
(rental accommodation, workplaces) individual approach to redressing
inequality (this person was refused accommodation or a job or denied a
promotion). It has thus provided a remedy for individual wrongs, reflec-
tive of its intent, initially, at least to reveal to people the error of their
ways. Its grounds based approach, imported into section 15, is an
impediment to a dynamic concept of identity. The need to "categorize"
the basis of the inequality as falling within recognized grounds makes it
difficult to view inequality in the more complex way required by the
intersecting identities to which I have previously referred:95 substantive
92. Eaton, supra note 87 at 274.
93. Marcia H. Rioux, "Towards a Concept of Equality ofWell-Being: Overcoming the Social
and Legal Construction of Inequality" (1994) 7 Can. J. L. & Jur. 127, 143. Rioux explores the
problem of formal equality theory "with its principles of homogeneity, individualism, and
interchangeability" for persons with intellectual disabilities: ibid., 135.
94. L'Heureux-DubM J. explicitly uses the term "subjective-objective standard" in Egan
which means that the effect of the distinction must be assessed "from the point of view of the
reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances, possessed of similar
attributes to, and under similar circumstances as, the group of which the rights claimant is a
member" and this approach apparently received the support of the full Court in Law, supra note
42 at 532.
95. Nitya Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity"
(1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179. Also see Beatty, supra note 83. Madam Justice L' Heureux-Dubd
has tried to rely less closely on the "grounds approach" (in Egan, especially) and some of her
general statements were approved in Law, yet the wording would seem to discourage taking
this analysis very far. It should be noted, however, that the possibility of a "synthesis" of
grounds was contemplated in Law, supra note 42 at 555.
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equality recognizes that "the self is a text with a multitude of dis-
courses" 96 and human rights discourse has not traditionally accommo-
dated this reality well.
While the section 15 jurisprudence should not be used as the definitive
interpretation of a foundational substantive equality principle, there are
lessons to be gained by considering it. On the one hand, it shows that
substantive equality is not alien to our judiciary but is, rather, at the heart
of their consideration of the constitution's explicit equality guarantee. On
the other, however, it illustrates the weaknesses even in a constitutional
context of the human rights jurisprudence on which it relies. The analysis
under a fundamental constitutional principle of substantive equality can
benefit from the work done to date on equality but it does not need to be
constrained by it. The constraints will derive from the principle's inter-
relationship with the other foundational principles relevant in any given
case and the coherent development of the constitutional framework as a
whole.
What are the implications of "taking account of difference"? The first
is to recognize the legitimacy of different views or approaches, needs or
experiences. The mainstream or dominant view is not necessarily the
only view and the goals which the mainstream or dominant group seek are
not necessarily those sought by non-dominant members of society.9 7
Substantive equality acknowledges that mainstream ("majority" or "domi-
nant") values, institutions and experiences are not always the appropriate
way to organize the society or to organize it for all its members.
Substantive equality is, in large measure, about disassembling the norm.
Furthermore, the experience of some members of society may be at odds
with that of others: how one perceives the police, groups of men walking
down the street, an emphasis on abortion rights rather than on the right to
give birth, a flight of steps and myriad other situations will often seem to
reflect a world different from how someone else experiences and per-
ceives these situations. But all are reflective of the fact that in our
heterogeneous societies one person's "truth" may be omitted from
someone else's truth or indeed may be someone else's "lie."
96. M.M. Slaughter, "The Multicultural Self: Questions of Subjectivity, Questions of
Power," in Rosenfeld, supra note 21 at 369, 374.
97. Leon E. Trakman, "Substantive Equality in Constitutional Jurisprudence: Meaning
within Meaning" (1994) 7 Can J. L. & Jur. 27 at 31: "the ends of privileged groups are not
coincident with those whom privileged groups, supposedly, empower." For an example, see
Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, "Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for
First Nations Women" in Caroline Andrew & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Women and the Canadian
State/Les Femmes et L'Etat Canadien (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1997) 64. For many First Nations women equality is not an end they seek. This is not
the same as saying that all women seek equality, but we need to recognize that it may take
different forms.
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In short, the meaning of equality is in part a revealing of inequality
which has been hidden because we have approached the inquiry (is there
inequality here?) from a particular point of view. Thus the inquiry
necessary to determine whether there is substantive inequality must be
undertaken from more than one viewpoint. As Crenshaw has said, when
examining a question which appears to be one of gender, we should ask
"where is the racism in this?" 98
Current inequality is a consequence of the interplay of historical
practice, existing norms and the detritus of apparently outdated norms,
deep-seated ideological assumptions and the failure to take adequate
measures to overcome recognized disadvantages. The inquiry raised by
claims of substantive inequality therefore requires asking what it is about
societal structures, existing norms and ideological assumptions which
results in inequality and what must be changed in order to achieve
equality.99 The process of constructing an identity for one group by
another-attributing characteristics and behaviours as oppositional to
how the constructing group sees itself-includes treating those con-
structed attributes as natural and therefore a legitimate basis for unequal
treatment.I10 These unstated attributions must be revealed. While neces-
sary, however, this analysis on its own fails to capture the need to treat
"ethnicity/race, gender, and class ... as social relations which have to do
with how people relate to each other through productive and reproductive
activities."'' 1 Equality is a relational concept which derives from the way
in which societal structures have governed those relations. Thus an
important part of the process is moving beyond the other-constructed, the
identity revealed through the gaze of the other, to the meaning of identity
developed internally, as well as recognizing that any internal identity will
contain its own tensions.
98. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color" in Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle, eds., After Identity: A
Readerin LawandCulture (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 350, fn. 6. Obviously, this question
applies in reverse and to other characteristics which may have a bearing on how law effects
people.
99. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). Minelle K.
Mahtain, "Polarity versus Plurality: Confessions of an Ambivalent Woman of Colour" (1994)
14 Can. Woman Studies 14, 17: of Indian/Iranian origin, Mahtain explains that "[r]egardless
of my own ambiguities about this placement [as a woman of colour], I have been positioned
as a mere bearer of an unexplained label."
100. Slaughter, supra note 96 at 372.
101. Roxana Ng, "Racism, Sexism, Canadian Nationalism" in Himani Bannerji, Returning
the Gaze: Essays on Racism, Feminism and Politics (Toronto: Sister Vision, 1993) at 230.
Nitya Iyer, "Disappearing Women: Racial-Minority Women in Human Rights Cases," in
Andrew & Rodgers, supra note 97 at 260: we need to see discrimination "as a relational and
structural problem whose solution calls for institutional change."
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The test of whether persons are being treated equally is whether they
are being treated as if they are of equal moral worth, recognizing that
equal moral worth may mean that it will be necessary to treat people
differently from each other in order to respect their specific needs and
experiences. There is no easy formula which can be applied to every
circumstance but rather a process which the courts are able to apply to the
particular context and persons involved. Accordingly, any substantive
equality assessment must be grounded in actual experience; furthermore,
the persons for whom it is a reality must have a means to communicate
that experience to decision-makers. The most successful communication
will be in their own "language," defined broadly, although this is not
always possible. "Hearing from the complainant about his or her own
experience" and "questioning one's own assumptions" reveal alterna-
tives to the dominant view. 12 This is why the Supreme Court required
that aboriginal oral histories be treated as evidence even though they do
not comply with "traditional" evidence rules.'03 The admission of oral
histories requires a reconsideration of the "authoritative language" of
evidence law.' 4 A substantive equality principle means that the consti-
tutional framework incorporates the negotiation of diverse claims through
"unpacking" the "shared language of constitutional recognition." As
Tully explains,
The aim of negotiations over cultural recognition is not to reach agreement
on universal principles and institutions, but to bring negotiators to recog-
nize their differences and similarities, so that they can reach agreement on
a form of association that accommodates their differences in appropriate
institutions and their similarities in shared institutions.105
The reality of cultural identity includes experiences which are differ-
entiated on the basis of sex, race, sexuality, class, ability and other
characteristics. There is, however, a tension between these differing
experiences both among "groups" or "communities" which share charac-
teristics and within individuals who consider themselves members of or
are "allocated to" a number of communities simultaneously. °6 For
102. For an example of judicial consideration of issues outside the judge's experience, see
Wendy Baker, "Women's Diversity: Legal Practice and Legal Education-A View from the
Bench" (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 199.
103. It is also another reason for finding that native women should be at the table during the
constitutional amendment process.
104. Tully, supra note 67 at 54.
105. Ibid. at 131.
106. By "allocated," I mean that individuals are treated as if they are members of communities
merely by "real" or perceived external characteristics, no matter what their own sense of
affinity with the group may be.
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example, not only are individuals members of ethnic or "racial" commu-
nities, but also of class or ability communities, as well as numbers of
others; any particular individual is likely to have an affinity with more
than one ethnic or cultural (or other) community. 10 7 (On the other hand,
when identity is imposed on us, it unlikely to be that complex, but rather
the imposition will simplify our identity according to pre-determined
categories, likely those comprising human rights grounds.) Our identifi-
cations and alignments are not static but shift with circumstances. Nor is
any particular group homogeneous. Feminists are among those well
aware of the temptation of universalizing experience and of the exclusion
that results from essentialism'08 and have sought "languages and images
that account for multiplicity and difference, that negotiate contradiction
in affirmative ways, and that give voice to a politics of hybridity and
coalition."'0 9 This approach is a reflection of the dynamic nature of
equality theory, both in process and in content.
The exploration of identity and of integration of identity into political,
social and legal practice is ongoing:
[C]ultures . . .are continuously contested, imagined and reimagined,
transformed and negotiated, both by their members and through their
interaction with others. The identity, and so the meaning, of any culture is
thus aspectival rather than essential: like many complex human phenom-
ena, such as language and games, cultural identity changes as it is
approached from different paths and a variety of aspects come into view.
Cultural diversity is a tangled labyrinth of intertwining cultural differences
and similarities, not a panopticon of fixed, independent and incommensu-
rable worldviews in which we are either prisoners or cosmopolitan
spectators in the central tower. l0
The inquiry into whether individuals or groups are experiencing
substantive inequality in a particular context demands a complex assess-
ment. It will ask how the equality needs of different people relate to each
other. In a pluralist society there will inevitably be differing views of what
it means to be equal as part of the more general project of different views
107. Iyer, supra note 95; Judy Scales-Trent, "Sameness and Difference in a Law School
Classroom: Working at the Crossroads," (1992) 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 415.
108. Nira Yuval-Davis, "Women, Ethnicity and Empowerment" in Ann Oakley & Juliet
Mitchell, eds., Who's Afraid of Feminism: Seeing Through the Backlash (New York: The New
Press, 1997) esp. 89ff; Angela P. Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Legal Theory" (1990) 42
Stanford L. Rev. 581; Rioux, supra note 94.
109. Lesley Heywood & Jennifer Drake, "Introduction" in Heywood and Drake, eds., Third
WaveAgenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997) at 9. Also see Daiva K. Stasiulis, "Feminist Intersectional Theorizing," in Li, ed., supra
note 39.
110. Tully, supra note 67 at II [emphasis in original].
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of the "good society."' 11 The inquiry cannot assume one view, but neither
can it be without moral (some might prefer "political") compass. The
values which govern this process and the meaning of substantive equality
are not immune from criticism or change, but neither are they without
some significant grounding in a more comprehensive understanding of
how people are to be treated and how they are expected to treat each other.
As those responsible for determining whether inequality exists and
what is required to replace it with equality, judges must be prepared to
"ask the other question" which "forces us to look for both the obvious and
non-obvious relationships of domination.""' It follows that judges must
be prepared to realize that their own experiences and "social location"
affect their view of the world and of the case before them and to go beyond
that.1 13 This approach turns the notion of judicial impartiality on its head
and ostensible neutrality is recognized for what it is: partiality and the
imposition, intentionally or not, of the dominant view or experience. If
judges do not acknowledge (in the pursuit of impartiality) the necessity
of questioning and act accordingly, they have failed to recognize that
"[p]reexisting inequalities in power and resources can only be repro-
duced, not redressed, in a legal arena that treats all participants identi-
cally.""'
111. In Political Liberalism, John Rawls acknowledges thatA Theory of Justice inadequately
took into account the fact that in a pluralist society not everyone would agree about what the
"well-ordered society" comprised: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996) at xvi. Rawls explains that "[p]olitical liberalism assumes that, for
political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the
normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of
a constitutional democratic regime."
112. Mar Matsuda, "Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition"
(1991) 43 Stanford L. Rev. 1183 at 1189. The failure to "ask the other question" when making
choices may mean that the result has unanticipated effects. For example, in finding obscenity
laws justifiable because pornography undermines the equality of women (unmodified), the
Supreme Court of Canada has been criticized for failing to appreciate the situation of gays and
lesbians: James Peterson, "Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law Inhibits the
Expression of Ideas about Sex and Gender" (1998) 2 Wisconsin L. Rev. 625. See R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. Another example is the institution of mandatory charging policies in
"domestic violence" complaints which failed to consider how effective they could be in
communities with a high distrust of the police.
113. Leslie Roman, "White is a Color! White Defensiveness, Postmodern and Anti-racist
Pedagogy" in Cameron McCarthy & Warren Critchlow, eds., Race Identity and Representa-
tion in Education (New York: Routledge, 1993). It is generally the case that "whiteness
generally is transparent to whites:" Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 81 at 106.
114. Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 81 at 109.
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In sum, substantive equality requires consideration of the impact of
government policy and decisions on the various communities subject to
them; that, in turn, requires a determination of how decisions affect
members of society because of unexamined beliefs about their needs,
behaviour and experiences. Substantive equality will require addressing
omissions (what needs to be added to satisfy substantive equality?) and
commissions (what needs to be removed to achieve substantive equal-
ity?). This is unlike formal equality which ensures that everyone is
subject to the law and that everyone is treated in the same way. The
characteristics which signal a reason to consider the impact of policy are
not static categories, however, and are not meant to suggest a society
divided into isolated groups whose members are seeking their predomi-
nant identity, but rather a society whose members' alignments or interests
may differ from time to time. These tend to be the characteristics which
underlie people's experiences in life, how they are treated by others and
their access to society's goods and benefits. In a broader sense, however,
the objective is to ensure that policy-making treats people with equal
dignity and respect, recognizing that it must be manifested in different
ways in light of the fact that people are differently situated. In order to
comply with substantive equality requirements, policy-makers must
consider interests relevant to the moral worth of those affected by the
policy or by its absence.
The characteristics of substantive equality which I have outlined
above are intended to provide an indication of the nature of substantive
equality. They are rooted in the interpretation of equality developed by
the Supreme Court under section 15, just as other constitutional prin-
ciples find echoes in the express guarantees which they resemble. Like
those other principles, however, a substantive equality foundational
principle would not be bound by the interpretation given its express
guarantee. The recognition of a substantive equality principle would
permit the evolution of an interpretation which can fulfil the promise of
substantive equality at which section 15 analysis has hinted. Substantive
equality is then susceptible to the evolution which the Court has devel-
oped in employing other values crucial to Canada's identity, such as
democracy or judicial independence.
Conclusion
In a country based on constitutional supremacy the choice of values to
include among fundamental constitutional principles is an indication of
which values are pre-eminent in the society. This was confirmed by the
Quebec Secession Reference which although directed at the specific issue
of Quebec separation represents the most comprehensive statement yet
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by the Supreme Court of Canada on the impact of foundational constitu-
tional or organizing principles. Building on that opinion and the treatment
of equality as a societal value I have argued that substantive equality is
sufficiently characteristic of Canada that it should be recognized as a
fundamental part of the constitutional framework, those principles from
which the explicit guarantees arise and by which they are assessed.' 5 I
have further outlined the beginning of an understanding of a foundational
substantive equality which finds some echo in the section 15 jurispru-
dence but which goes beyond the interpretation of section 15. A founda-
tional substantive equality deserves its own interpretation which will be
informed by and in turn inform the other foundational principles relevant
to any given situation.
Recognition of a foundational constitutional principle of substantive
equality would contribute to the on-going construction of the "internal
architecture" of Canada's Constitution. 116
115. Louis Henkin, "A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic
Defects," in Rosenfeld, ed., supra note 21 at 48.
116. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 2 at 248.
